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EU COHESION POLICY
Some fundamental questions
INDHIRA SANTOS,MAY 2009
OBJECTIVE
The main objective of this note is to highlight some
of the key issues still left unresolved by current
EU cohesion policy. The operational goal of the
paper is to stimulate debate on future reforms in
the framework of the ongoing EU Budget Review
and the forthcoming negotiations on the next EU
financial framework (the so-called ‘financial per-
spectives’). The questions posed do not have a
right or wrong answer, are deliberately left open
and are meant to contribute to the debate on the
state-of-play and on the future of cohesion policy.
While my focus is mainly on efficiency and
redistributive considerations, these questions
should be considered in the broader context of
other EU policies, competencies and instruments,
as well as, of course, existing political and
financial constraints.
The note is organised as follows. First, I describe
the main features of cohesion policy, focusing on
the  de jure and  de facto objectives and
instruments. Second, I use the information
provided by member states during the EU budget
review consultation process to flesh out some of
the potential areas of disagreement in future
negotiations over cohesion policy. Third, I focus on
structural funds (leaving aside the cohesion fund)
where there are a number of key issues for
discussion. Fourth, I highlight two additional
dimensions that are critical for the future of EU
cohesion policy, namely the Lisbon agenda and
crisis management. Finally, I propose three
questions for the conference discussion. 
COHESION POLICY:
OBJECTIVES, INSTRUMENTS AND RATIONALE
On objectives and instruments
Reducing welfare differences across the EU's re-
gions and countries has been one of the EU’s main
objectives since its foundation. EU cohesion pol-
icy has three key financial arms: the European
fund for regional development (ERDF), the Euro-
pean social fund (ESF) – in this note grouped as
'structural funds' – and the cohesion fund (CF).
While the first two are allocated to regions, the
third is targeted at lagging countries. Structural
funds (SF) and the cohesion fund represent on av-
erage 29 percent and seven percent of the EU
budget, respectively, in the period 2007-2013.
Is unconditional convergence in per capita
income across regions a feasible policy
objective? Are there better measures of
disparity?
The ERDF mainly supports infrastructure develop-
ment and productive investment; the ESF facili-
tates the integration of the unemployed and
disadvantaged into the labour market; and, finally,
the Cohesion Fund targets trans-European trans-
port networks and environmental projects.
These financial instruments are used toEU COHESION POLICYIndhira Santos
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accomplish three broad objectives: 1)
convergence, which accounts for 81.5 percent of
total funds and focuses on the least-developed
regions; 2) regional  competitiveness and
employment, which amounts to 16 percent of total
funds and targets regions outside the
convergence objective and is stated to encourage
innovation, entrepreneurship and environmental
protection, as well as to accommodate structural
change; and 3) European territorial co-operation,
amounting to 2.5 percent of total funds and
comprising trans-national programmes (Table 1).
Table 1:  Structural and cohesion funds:
objectives and instruments, 2007-2013
Source: Bruegel based on DG Regio
More specifically in terms of objectives, the cur-
rent financial framework  sets boosting growth,
jobs and innovation as the main priorities of co-
hesion policy in the framework of the renewed Lis-
bon strategy. But there is really a cacophony of
objectives for EU cohesion policy (Annex 1). This
makes policy design and assessment a very com-
plex affair.
How can the overall objective of EU cohesion
policies be made more operational?
Moreover, as a result of this structure, all EU re-
gions, rich and poor, are eligible for structural fund-
ing, and all regions are targeted by all financial
instruments. Since there is no one-to-one corre-
spondence between objectives and instruments,
growth and redistribution policies are served by
the same funding instruments.
Should all regions be eligible for structural
funds?
Is there a tension between growth and
redistributive objectives? How can one best
think about possible trade-offs?
On rationale
What types of spending are desirable at the EU
level? Economic rationalisation of EU-level inter-
vention traditionally points at market failures –
notably economies of scale/scope and externali-
ties – since they are associated with under-provi-
sion of public goods in the absence of government
intervention. In the case of economies of scale
and scope, EU intervention promotes efficiency
because scaled-up production leads to reduction
in the long-run average unit costs (scale), and be-
cause the increase in the number of policies ad-
ministered at the EU level creates synergies in
production and distribution (scope). Similarly, in
markets where there are significant externalities,
ie benefits or costs that accrue not only to the in-
dividuals in a country directly involved in the
transaction but also to others in the EU, centrali-
sation can allow for the appropriate distribution of
compensations and costs. For instance, signifi-
cant economies of scale/scope and externalities
are thought to be present in R&D and defence poli-
cies.
The appropriate role of the EU across policy do-
mains, especially in redistribution, has been de-
bated for many years. Redistribution from richer
to poorer countries is often seen as an EU public
good since it fosters convergence, creating major
benefits for the rest of Europe in the form of new
and wealthier markets and steadier democracies.
But sub-national redistribution is more divisive.
Subsidiarity, horizontal equity across countries,
transaction and information costs and the need
for coherence with national macroeconomic
policy, all suggest that national governments are
best placed for this task, provided they do not
violate state aid rules. New member states are a
case in point. These countries allocate most
structural funds to thematic rather than regional
programmes, ie to infrastructure or research.
While this does not prevent countries from
decentralising project implementation and
evaluation, it emphasises the need for the EU to
use country-level criteria for allocation of funds.
Moreover, politically, it should be much easier to
Convergence ERDF, ESF, CF
Regional Competitiveness and
Employment
ERDF, ESF
European Territorial Cooperation ERDFEU COHESION POLICYIndhira Santos
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convince citizens of the desirability of policies that
redistribute income across countries in Europe
rather than among individuals, groups or regions,
since there is likely to be a higher sense of
solidarity in the former (Tabellini, 2003).
What are the advantages of EU involvement in
regional policy? Are structural funds the best
instrument available?
In which areas is the tension between
cohesion policy and sectoral policies stronger?
How can this better be addressed?
WHAT DO MEMBER STATES DISAGREE ABOUT?
If one uses the official positions put forward by
member states during the EU Budget Review as a
basis for analysing their views on cohesion policy,
some important insights arise. First, views vary
widely across countries, not only in terms of co-
hesion policy, but also in terms of the overall EU
budget and policy priorities.
Second, within cohesion policy, most disagree-
ments are related to regional expenditures, in par-
ticular, whether funds should go to all regions
regardless of the country, only to poor regions or
– stricter still – only to poor regions in poor coun-
tries (Table 2).
Table 2:  Member states’ positions in the EU Budget
Review: structural funds for which regions?
Source: Bruegel, based on member states’ position papers
submitted to DG Budget during EU Budget Review
What reforms are possible from a political
standpoint?
EU budgetary negotiations involve major inter-
country transfers. A significant part of these are
fundamentally side-payments that help to get
agreements finalised. Structural funds in particular
– given their ex-antegeographic allocation – play
a key role in this respect, to the detriment of pol-
icy quality (see Santos (2008) for a detailed dis-
cussion of this issue). Many of the disagreements
discussed above, therefore, and those in other EU
policy areas, are reflected ultimately in the distri-
bution of structural funds. Annex 2 presents the ad-
ditional allocations of structural funds included in
the European Council agreement of December
2005 on the current financial framework.  Provi-
sions added only to the final agreement are purely
selective and discretionary in nature since they
come on top of the original funds assigned ac-
cording to the pre-established eligibility criteria.
They are a clear example of side-payments needed
to ensure the required unanimous agreement. 
Adding up the provisions included only in the final
agreement, these side-payments account for 1.5
percent of total cohesion spending between 2007
and 2013, but have a widely differing impact for
individual member states. While Hungary receives
0.6 percent of total cohesion spending through the
extra money, it represents as much as seven per-
cent of total cohesion spending in Spain, nine per-
cent of total cohesion spending in Sweden and 11
percent of total cohesion spending in Austria for
the period under consideration.
An additional area of disagreement relates to the
flexibility of funds. For example, funds cannot be
transferred to capital cities, where, in new member
states in particular, national authorities want to
direct more resources as expressed in the official
documents presented for the consultation on the
EU budget. Recent measures announced by the
European Commission, allowing for more flexibility
in the use of structural funds to help member
states weather the global economic crisis, give
some legitimacy to those concerns.
Only poor
regions
Only poor
regions in poor
countries
All regions
Finland
Latvia
Lithuania
Romania
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Hungary
Ireland
Netherlands
Portugal
Sweden
United Kingdom
Slovakia (?)
Austria
Cyprus
France
Germany
Greece
Italy
Malta
Spain 
Luxembourg
Poland (?)EU COHESION POLICYIndhira Santos
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Do all countries need the same degree of
decentralisation in structural funds?
What is the optimal degree of flexibility in the
assignment of structural funds within
countries?
Since most discussions relate to the regional
dimension of cohesion policies, I focus on this
aspect next.
STRUCTURAL FUNDS:
EFFICIENCY AND REDISTRIBUTION1
Overall, the evidence regarding the impact of
structural funds on growth is mixed2. The literature
on this topic has three main limitations that make
identifying causal effects difficult. First, the ef-
fects on growth of these policies may take time to
become apparent. Second, it is difficult to make a
causal interpretation of results, as structural
funds are not allocated randomly. Third, SF-asso-
ciated opportunity costs are not taken into ac-
count. EU taxpayers’ money could be used
elsewhere. The relevant question from a policy
perspective is if structural funds boost overall
growth above what it would have been without the
structural funds.
The structural funds’ contribution to growth may
be curtailed by several factors. The literature
points to the displacement of national regional aid,
or to regions’ strategic behaviour as they imple-
ment projects that have other objectives besides
growth, either to pursue rent-seeking activities or
to retain their SF eligibility. Similarly, the potential
lack of coherence with national policies is also
cited as a limitation (Santos, 2008).
But three other factors should be highlighted. The
redistributive role of structural funds channels re-
sources away from economic centres – reducing
growth potential – instead of focusing first on the
efficient use of funds. Furthermore, with the EU’s
eastern enlargement, regional policy resources
are thinly spread. The population of regions where
GDP per capita is 75 percent or less of the EU av-
erage increased from 68 million to 116 million (or
from 18 to 25 percent of the EU27 population). Fi-
nally, the nature of the redistribution that takes
place through structural funds also limits the
growth potential of structural policies.
On average, poorer regions receive more structural
funds per inhabitant net of their contribution to
the policy. This relationship is stronger among
convergence regions but, on average, a regional
per capita GDP increase of €100 is associated
with a decrease of €7 in net structural fund aid per
capita. Regions in cohesion countries, under one
and the same structural fund objective, benefit
more from structural policies than regions in non-
cohesion countries, as do regions in countries that
have a more unequal per capita income
distribution. 
In 2000-2006, 27 percent of SF flows were inter-
country transfers. But, of the rest, three quarters
were intra-regional. With enlargement, inter-coun-
try transfers rose for 2007-2013, but intra-re-
gional redistribution is still twice as large as
redistribution between regions in the same coun-
try. That is, for all countries, structural funds
largely redistribute resources among individuals
within one and the same region. 
Two examples may help illustrate the above
findings. For Spain, a net beneficiary of structural
funds during the 2007-2013 period, 19 percent of
SF received originates from other EU countries. Of
the remaining 80 percent, two thirds of the money
spent in each region comes from that region. The
UK, meanwhile, is a net contributor to structural
funds. Of the SF received by each UK region, 97
percent was simply contributed by local
taxpayers.
‘Intra-regional redistribution is twice as large as redistribution between regions in the same
country. For all countries, structural funds largely redistribute resources among individuals
within one and the same region.’
1. This section comes from
Santos (2008).
2. See Enderveen et al.
(2002) for a review of this
literature.EU COHESION POLICYIndhira Santos
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This exercise reveals two additional points. Two re-
gions with similar per capita income, but located in
different countries, can benefit very differently
from structural funds. Take, for example, Hainaut
(Belgium) and Galicia (Spain), both under the
convergence objective. Both have a GDP per capita
(PPP) of €17,400, but while Hainaut is a net con-
tributor (€388 per capita) Galicia is a net benefi-
ciary (€949 per capita). This difference arises
because, while structural fund benefits depend on
regional income, contributions depend on how
much the country as a whole contributes to the EU
policy. If a region’s GDP per capita is very different
from the country's regional average, there can be
a mismatch between what it receives and what it
has to contribute to structural funds. 
Moreover, even with similar regions in countries
with comparable income, there is variation in the
net benefits they derive from structural funds. For
instance, Guadeloupe (France) and Sicily (Italy)
have a GDP per capita of approximately €14,000,
yet the former receives – net per capita – 33 per-
cent more funds. An immediate implication of this
result relates to the logic behind redistribution in
structural funds. 
If the goal is regional convergence, should net
benefits (and not only benefits) be determined
on a regional basis? 
How should one account for non-income
factors that disadvantage one region more
than others? 
Moreover, even if one were to agree that the EU
should play a role in redistribution among regions,
the calculation of the amount of structural funds
to be received should not depend on the pre-tax
and pre-transfer income but rather on the regional
disparities that are left after accounting for
national redistribution policies.
One subject discussed above re-emerges here. If
most of the funds received by a region originate
from that same region, it is hard to imagine that
they can have significant 'added-value' growth
effects. To really measure the impact of structural
funds one needs to show that they generate
benefits above and beyond what those resources
would have accomplished if there were no
structural funds. 
This points to the main difficulty in assessing the
real impact of cohesion policy, especially struc-
tural funds, on growth. Proper evaluation of the
policy remains an elusive and daunting challenge
since it is difficult to separate empirically what ef-
fects are due to cohesion policy and what to other
policies or initial conditions. While policy evalua-
tion of specific projects and programmes is possi-
ble, that of cohesion policy as a whole is more
difficult. One possibility is to move in the direction
of randomised experiments, taking advantage of
the wide range of initial conditions and pro-
grammes to test what works and what does not
and under what conditions. The difficulty, how-
ever, is in generalising findings, since what may
work in one specific setting may work differently
in others, or effects may change when projects or
programmes are scaled up.
What role does randomised experimentation
have in evaluating cohesion policy, especially
structural funds?
In this note, I have so far focused on those areas of
EU cohesion policy where the debate is most
heated. I have, therefore, largely ignored other as-
pects where cohesion policy also plays a role. Im-
proving regions’ management culture, fostering
cross-regional and international partnerships,
spreading good practice and improving citizens’
attitudes towards the EU are often cited as bene-
fits of cohesion policy. 
While these elements of cohesion policy have their
value, the question is ultimately if EU cohesion
‘If a region’s GDP per capita is very different from the country's regional average, there can be
a mismatch between what it receives and what it has to contribute to structural funds.’EU COHESION POLICYIndhira Santos
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policy is the best instrument to achieve them.
While regional policies may be needed to achieve
those objectives, it is not evident that this implies
a European regional policy. EU involvement must
be justified by improving outcomes in comparison
to other delivery and policy alternatives.
How should other benefits of cohesion policy
be taken into account, such as improving
regions’ management culture, fostering cross-
regional and international partnerships or
spreading best practices and improving
citizens’ attitude towards the EU?
TWO MORE ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE
Lisbon priorities
The Lisbon strategy aims at making Europe the
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based
economy with sustainable economic growth, more
and better jobs and greater social cohesion. The
Commission’s proposal for the financial frame-
work 2007-2013 envisaged increasing the share
spent on competitiveness from 7.5 percent of the
budget in 2006 to 13 percent on average between
2007 and 2013. The final agreement, however,
lifted this share to an annual average of only 8.6
percent.
In cohesion policy, the strategy followed the same
lines, with a desire to make cohesion policies an
important instrument for achieving the Lisbon
goals. This shift in priorities translated into a quar-
ter of the resources for the 2007-2013 financial
period being earmarked for research and innova-
tion and about 30 percent being allocated to en-
vironmental infrastructure and measures to
combat climate change.   
Re-orientation of structural policies so as to align
them with the Lisbon objectives in the last budg-
etary negotiations was a step in the right direc-
tion. Lisbon policies whose benefits are not
limited to the spending country – namely trans-
port and energy networks, as well as research –
have a clear EU dimension and are good candi-
dates to boost growth.
The main concern is whether focusing on the Lis-
bon agenda leaves enough room for regions and
countries of different levels of development to
focus on the appropriate priorities. There seems
to be an indication, however, that member states
and regions do have different approaches, for ex-
ample, to innovation (Figure 1).
Is concentration on Lisbon goals appropriate
for all regions?
What should and should not count as Lisbon
expenditure?
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Figure 1: Innovation in cohesion policy and economic development
Source: Bruegel, based on SEC (2007) 1547 Commission Staff Working Document, Regions delivering
innovation through cohesion policyEU COHESION POLICYIndhira Santos
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Economic crisis
We have seen that the effects of the economic
crisis are asymmetric and that vulnerabilities are
heterogeneous both across countries and across
regions in the EU. In light of the global economic
crisis, the European Commission has recently
decided to increase flexibility in the use of
structural funds3. The measures taken include the
extension of the deadline for member states to
use up their structural fund allocations from the
2000-2006 financial period. In particular, the
Commission has asked regions to concentrate
resources in 'high-return' projects, especially
those that can create green jobs, foster energy
efficiency and develop clean technologies.  In
addition, the proportion of funds that can be
reallocated between spending priorities has been
increased from two to ten percent, also leading to
more flexibility in the use of funds.
What other alternatives exist for the role of
structural and cohesion funds in periods of
crisis?
What does the need for increased flexibility at
this time tell us about the desired role and
design of structural policies?
3. EC, ‘Commission
increases flexibility of
structural funds in
response to the
financial crisis’,
IP/09/310, Brussels, 24
February 2009,
available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/p
ressReleasesAction.do?
reference=IP/09/310&f
ormat=HTML&aged=0&l
anguage=EN&guiLangu
age=en
BOILING IT DOWN:
THREE BROAD QUESTIONS FOR DEBATE
While the issues are many and varied, three
overarching dimensions seem useful for the
debate:
1. Impact: What specific conclusions can one
draw from the existing evidence about
cohesion policy? What specific policies, in
which settings, seem to work best? For which
objectives is the policy best suited?
2. Subsidiarity: While there seems to be a
consensus on the importance and role of
cohesion funds, the same agreement does not
exist for structural policies. Who should benefit
from structural funds? In what form?
3. Evaluation: How can we better evaluate
cohesion policy?
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ANNEX 1.
GOAL CONGESTION: 32 OBJECTIVES OF COHESION POLICY AND COUNTING...
Solidarity
Convergence (countries)
Convergence (regions)
Regional growth
Regional competitiveness
European growth
European competitiveness
Administrative modernisation
Institutional development
Environmental protection
Climate policy
EU visibility to citizens
EU legitimacy
European identity
Redistributive justice
Rural development
Urban development
Source: Tarschys (2008)
Retraining of the unemployed
Fighting social exclusion
Integration of vulnerable groups
Gender equality in labour market
Boosting small & medium enterprises
Inter-regional network-building
Inter-regional learning
Linking regional elites to Brussels
Trans-frontier cooperation
Compensation for internal market
Compensation for monetary union
Making enlargement acceptable in some areas of
the old member states
Making enlargement acceptable in disadvantaged
regions of the new member states
Territorial cohesion
Cohesion (sense of community)EU COHESION POLICYIndhira Santos
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ANNEX 2. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS, SUBHEADING COHESION, FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK 2007-2013
Luxembourg Presidency final negotiating box 15 June 2005 European Council agreement 15 Dec 2005
Special rates of assistance for "phasing-out" regions in a member
state that represent at least one third of the total population of the
regions fully eligible for Objective 1 assistance in 2006
Unchanged
Starting point in 2007 for those regions which were not eligible for
Objective 1 status in the 2000-2006 period or whose eligibility
started in 2004 will be 90% of their theoretical 2006 per capita aid
intensity level ...
Unchanged
Polish NUTS level II regions of Lubelskie, Podkarpackie, Warmínsko-
Mazurskie, Podlaskie and Swietokrzyskie: additional funding of 10
euros per inhabitantper year over the period 2007-2013
Additional funding of € 107 per inhabitantover the period 2007-
2013
Cyprus will receive “phasing-in” support in 2007–2013 Unchanged
“Phasing out” support for Itä-Suomi and Madeira Unchanged
Outermost regions will receive additional funding of €30per
inhabitant per year
Additional funding will amount to €35per inhabitant per year
Under the Territorial Cooperation Objective aid intensity for regions
along the former external terrestrial borders will be 50% higher than
for the other regions concerned
Unchanged
200 million euros will be allocated for the PEACE Programme in
Northern Ireland
Unchanged plus “programme will be implemented in full respect of
additionality”
Közép-Magyarország shall be allocated an additional envelope of
€140 million
Prague shall be allocated an additional envelope of € 200 million
The NUTS level II region of the Canaries will benefit from an
additional envelope of € 100 million over the period 2007-2013
Swedish regions falling under the Regional Competitiveness and
Employment Objective shall be allocated an additional ERDF
envelope of € 150 million
Estonia and Latvia shall each be allocated additional funding of €
35 per capita over the period 2007-2013
Austrian regions falling under the Regional Competitiveness and
Employment Objective situated on the former external borders of
the EU shall be allocated an additional ERDF envelope of € 150
million 
Bavaria shall be allocated a similar additional envelope of € 75
million
Spain shall benefit from an additional allocation of € 2 billion under
the ERDF
Ceuta and Melilla shall be allocated an additional ERDF envelope of
€ 50m over the period 2007-2013
Italy will be allocated an additional envelope of € 1.4 billion 
In recognition of the particular circumstances of Corsica (30) and
French Hainaut (70), France shall receive an additional allocation
of €100m over the period 2007-13 under the regional
competitiveness and employment objective
An additional allocation of EUR 225 m shall be allocated to the
Eastern Länder of Germany which are eligible for support under the
Convergence objective
Source: Neheider and Santos (2009), based on Council of the European Union (2005): Financial Perspective 2007-2013,
Brussels, 15 June 2005, 10090/05, CADREFIN 130; Council of the European Union (2005): Financial Perspective 2007-
2013, Brussels, 19 December 2005, 15915/05, CADREFIN 268.